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This Article considersfour myths about the history of civil rights activism
that have tended to cloud assessments about current civil rights law and its
potential future directions. I argue that correcting those myths can help
illuminatepromisingpaths for the future. In each instance, alternative historical
narrativesreveal a rich recordof experimentationwith diverse ideas. This history
suggests many alternative routesfor further development of core principles of
civil rights law, includingfurther theoreticaland practicalwork to pursue longstanding concepts of structural discrimination, the promise of experimentalist
approaches to regulation and enforcement, increased interdisciplinary
collaboration between law and other social science fields, and more focus on
matters of economic inequality and other forms of inequitable resource
distribution that have both class and race components. All of these reflect central
but unfinished goals of the civil rights movement throughout its long history
stretchingback into the nineteenth century.
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My task here is to lay out some perhaps forgotten or overlooked aspects of
civil rights history in order to help frame the presentations that will follow. I do
so by "busting" four myths about the history of civil rights activism. Because I
recently researched the historical origins of employment discrimination law,
and disparate impact doctrine in particular, I will draw some examples from
that area, but many of the points I will make can be generalized to other areas
of civil rights law as well.
The four myths I will refute are as follows:
1) The core of civil rights concern was intentional discrimination;
structural or effects-based concepts were peripheral ideas added only much
later;
2) Lawyers developed federal civil rights law primarily through highprofile test case litigation in federal courts;
3) The civil rights movement unduly focused on a legal liberalist agenda;
4) Efforts to address social resource inequalities through civil rights law
have largely failed and are doomed to fail due to the limits of law in reaching
private social orderings.
I. MYTH NUMBER ONE: THE CORE OF CIVIL RIGHTS CONCERN WAS
INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION; STRUCTURAL OR EFFECTS-BASED CONCEPTS
WERE PERIPHERAL IDEAS ADDED MUCH LATER
The United States Supreme Court's recent civil rights jurisprudence1 and
some recent civil rights scholarship 2 emphasize intentional discrimination as
the core of civil rights law. This trend corresponds with a call for the return to
so-called core principles of antidiscrimination law, especially a focus on the
prohibition of invidious discrimination, defined as specific, triable acts of
dignitary affront inflicted with discriminatory motive. A further assumption
posits that in our current uncertain times, characterized by rapid social,
demographic and political change, a return to the core values of
antidiscrimination law would be a positive move.

1. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2072-82 (2009) (upholding a
disparate treatment claim filed against a city fire department that had decided not to validate
the results of a promotion test where it had a severe disparate impact on the basis of race).
2. Michael Selmi, Was the DisparateImpact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV.
701, 732-45 (2006) (arguing that the core of employment antidiscrimination law is
intentional discrimination and that disparate impact theory may have been a mistake).
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Several analytic problems mar the argument just summarized. In the first
place, no particular logic commends the idea that a return to core principles is
the most prudent course in times of change or uncertainty. Exactly the opposite
tack may be needed: new ideas may be necessary to respond to new challenges.
But even more basically, the argument fails because its factual premise simply
is not accurate, especially as viewed from the perspective of the activists who
fought to bring about our current system of civil rights protections. To be sure,
civil rights activists were always concerned about the problem of racial
prejudice, but they were most concerned with how this prejudice manifested
itself in institutions offering or denying paths to opportunity for persons of
color. They did not believe they could change institutions simply by
prosecuting persons based on the particular feelings they harbored in their
hearts; instead, what civil rights activists wanted from as far back as the days of
abolitionism was the broad-scale removal of structural barriers to advancement.
To abolitionists such as Frederick Douglass, the treatment of African
Americans in employment, as a society-wide phenomenon, was a key measure
of the country's progress away from slavery. Douglass viewed the systemic
relegation of African Americans to menial employment in service positions in
the North as akin to slavery in the South; he argued that such structural
subordination was an indication that both regions of the country were deeply
implicated in an economic system built on racial injustice. As Douglass
explained in one speech, "shaving, boot-blacking, and carrying parcels, are
nothing better than being slaves to the community; and [we] ought never to
relax [our] agitation until this species of slavery is abolished as firmly as that
which exists in the South." 3 In other words, Douglass blamed employment
subordination on systematic exclusion, not on the acts of particular prejudiced
employers that should be individually rooted out.
One might expect that Emancipation would ease the problem of racial
employment subordination but, of course, precisely the opposite phenomenon
occurred. The end of Reconstruction and the rise of Jim Crow produced the
historical period known as "the nadir, ' characterized by lynchings and other
forms of terror directed against African Americans, mass political
disfranchisement throughout the South, and society-wide segregation and
subordination in a vast array of goods and services including education,
housing, employment, health and access to medical care, transportation,
municipal services, accommodations, and entertainment. In the employment
arena, the pushing of racially disfavored minorities into the least desirable
employment sectors became even more pronounced and severe over time, as
3. See Great Abolition Movement-Manifesto of the Negros, BENNETT'S N.Y. HERALD,
reprintedin THE NORTH STAR (Rochester), Nov. 10, 1848.
4. See RAYFORD W. LOGAN, THE NEGRO IN AMERICAN LIFE AND THOUGHT: THE NADIR,

1877-1901 (1954) (discussing the concept of the nadir); see also RAYFORD W. LOGAN, THE
BETRAYAL OF THE NEGRO FROM RUTHERFORD B. HAYES TO WOODROW WILSON 11-12 (1965)

(noting the debate about dating the nadir and suggesting it extended into the 1920s).
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large literature documents. 5 Again, this society-wide phenomenon occurred not
only because of the racial prejudice lying in the hearts of individual employers,
but also because of a socio-structural web of institutions and practices. Even
when it was in the interests of rational, economically self-maximizing
employers to hire persons of color because they could be hired for much lower
wages,6 third-party agency enforced a pervasive color bar against racial
minorities moving into more favored occupational sectors as white workers
used both law and violence to maintain a racial7 monopoly over job sectors that
provided paths to relative economic prosperity.
Discriminatory labor statutes helped enforce the systemic and structural
8
exclusion of racial minorities from desirable occupations. Informal strategies

5. See generally DAVID ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING

OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (2007) (covering both antebellum and postbellum
periods); JAMES W.

LOEWEN, SUNDOWN TOWNS 35 (2005) ("Before the Nadir, African

Americans worked as carpenters, masons, foundry and factory workers, postal carriers, and
so on. After 1890, in both the North and the South, whites expelled them from these
occupations."); ALLAN H. SPEAR, BLACK CHICAGO, 1890-1920, at 29-35 (1967) (describing

the decline in job prospects for working-class African Americans in Chicago at turn of the
twentieth century); JOHN DITTMER, BLACK GEORGIA INTHE PROGRESSIVE ERA: 1900-1920, at

1-71 (1977) (describing late nineteenth century exclusion of African Americans from
railroad and textile industries in Georgia); ALMA HERBST, THE NEGRO INTHE SLAUGHTERING
AND MEAT-PACKING INDUSTRY IN CHICAGO 17 (Arno ed. 1971) (1932) (describing change in

white workers' attitudes towards African American meatpacking workers in the 1890s).
Chicanos had similar experiences. See Juan G6mez-Quifiones, The First Steps: Chicano
Labor Conflict and Organizing, 1900-1920, 3 AZATLAN J. CHICANO STUD. 13, 22-23 (1972).
6. See, e.g., PAUL ORTIZ, EMANCIPATION BETRAYED: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF BLACK
ORGANIZING AND WHITE VIOLENCE IN FLORIDA FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE BLOODY

ELECTION OF 1920, at 11 (2005) (quoting one white southern politician's observation that
"[c]olored labor is the cheapest, and therefore just the kind suited to the South in its present
condition. This fact must have weight also with capitalists, for other things being equal, the
returns from an investment must increase in proportion to the cheapness of the labor
employed.").
7. See I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RACE RIOTS 361, 460, 999 (Walter Rucker &
James N. Upton eds., 2007) [hereinafter RACE RIOTS] (describing various labor-related
incidents of racial violence); WILLIAM H HARRIS, THE HARDER WE RUN: BLACK WORKERS
SINCE THE CIVIL WAR 35, 99 (1982); RICHARD CORTNER, A MOB INTENT ON DEATH 5-23

(1988) (describing whites' attack against African American sharecroppers who were meeting
in an attempt to improve their employment conditions); James Gilbert Ryan, The Memphis
Riots of 1866: Terror in a Black Community During Reconstruction, 62 J. NEGRO HIST. 243,
244 (1977) (locating as a cause of the 1886 Memphis race riot the fact that black civilians
often had to compete with the city's Irish immigrants for low-skilled jobs); PATRICIA A.
SCHECHTER, IDA B. WELLS-BARNETT AND AMERICAN REFORM, 1880-1930, at 75-77 (2001)

(describing an 1892 Memphis lynching precipitated by conflict between an African
American storekeeper and white competitors).
8. See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN AMERICANS,
LABOR REGULATIONS, AND THE COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL 6, 28, 37-

38, 50, 51-52, 58, 66, 75, 86 (2001) (compiling many examples of state and federal labor
legislation that directly or indirectly discriminated against African Americans); STATES'
LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR (Pauli Murray ed., 1951) (important civil rights lawyer's

compilation of racially discriminatory state laws).
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played a part as well. These included pressure tactics white workers used
against employers who hired persons of color. These tactics took place during
the labor conflicts that were a regular feature of industrial life in the North, in
which employers sometimes cynically manipulated race by transporting
African American workers from the South to take the place of striking workers
as scab laborers. 9 But job actions aimed at keeping racial minorities out of jobs
white workers viewed as their entitlement took place in the absence of scab
labor as well, and frequently involved brutal violence including outright
murder. 10
Thus when the NAACP and the National Urban League were founded in
1910, their leaders confronted an economic and social system predicated on
systemic racial subordination in a host of arenas, including employment. This
system was deeply entrenched and a product of social structure and practice
beyond particular individuals' prejudice. The founding leaders of these
organizations experimented with strategies that would change society at the
structural and institutional level, because their analysis showed that the
problem of racial subordination needed to be attacked at those levels."l
I have elsewhere written about the role of the early leaders of the National
Urban League in experimenting with strategies for loosening the pervasive
structural bar against the advancement of racial minorities into more favored
employment sectors.12 National Urban League leaders-none of whom were
lawyers, a point to which I will return below-did not in the early decades of
the twentieth century view private-sector employment discrimination as a
matter reachable through legal regulation. Instead, they relied on appeals to
progressive employers to increase their hiring and advancement of minorities
9. See HERBST, supra note 5, at 17 (describing use of violence against African
American strikebreakers in the Pullman Strike of 1894); MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM
CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 106

(2004) ("Unions secured legislation that required that plumbers and electricians be
licensed-measures that proved effective at excluding blacks. On the railroads, black

firemen lost jobs through a terrorist campaign that killed dozens."); id. at 64 ("Massive
outbreaks of white-on-black violence erupted in East St. Louis in 1917 ... killing an
estimated forty-eight... people ...most of them black"); RACE RIOTS, supra note 7, at 55253 (describing the 1919 national steel industry strike that led to white mob attacks on
African American workers in many parts of the country); WILLIAM M. TUTTLE, JR., RACE
RIOT: CHICAGO INTHE RED SUMMER OF 1919, at 109 (1970) (noting that the race riot of 1919
was "a violent outcrop of the long-standing discord between white and black job competitors
in the Chicago Labor market. In fact, several contemporaries claimed that labor was perhaps
the most significant cause of the riot.").
10. See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 9, at 65 ("Around 1910, unionized white railway
workers struck employers in an effort to have black firemen dismissed. When the strike
failed, they simply murdered many of the black workers").
11. On the ideas underlying the founding of the NAACP, see Susan D. Carle,
Debunking the Myth of Civil Rights Liberalism: Visions of Racial Justice in the Thought of

T. Thomas Fortune, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1479, 1530-32 (2009).
12. Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII DisparateImpact Analysis,
63 FLA. L. REV. 251, 262 (2011).
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(as a kind of voluntary affirmative action plan, to translate their ideas into
presentist concepts). At the same time, the National Urban League emphasized
job training and job placement services in order to match qualified minority
applicants to willing employers. 3 The speeches of even the most dedicated and
visionary of these early leaders, such as William L. Bulkley, a founder of both
the National Urban League and the NAACP 14 and the first African American

principal of New York City's newly consolidated unitary school system,' 5 are
remarkable both for the clarity of their perspective on the structural nature of
to use broad-scale voluntarist,
racial employment subordination and their desire
6
or non-legal, appeals to achieve social change.'
Law's entry into the field of private employment discrimination took place
gradually. The earliest statutory fixes addressed public-sector employment,
prohibiting government entities from engaging in discrimination. The New
Deal, and then the World Wars, especially World War II, began to break open
the realm of private-sector employment as an area for civil rights regulation.
Government contracting during the War, the valor of African American troops
who fought abroad for a country that denied them equal citizenship rights at
home, and the ugly face of fascism in Europe, all brought home to white
Americans the depths of racial injustice in their own country. The migration of
African Americans out of the South where they were politically disfranchised
and into the North where they could vote increased their aggregate political
power. In 1940, President Roosevelt capitulated to A. Philip Randolph's threat
to lead a march on Washington to protest race discrimination in wartime
industries with the issuance of Executive Order 8802, which for the first time
banned employment discrimination on the basis of race by private employers
engaged in government contracting. This Executive Order created a Fair
Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) to oversee compliance with its
mandate. 17

Executive Order 8802 and its successors were limited in their power and
short in duration, but nevertheless heralded employment antidiscrimination law
as we know it today. 8 As scholars who have studied the FEPCs from a variety

13. See generally GUICHARD PARRIS & LESTER BROOKS, BLACKS IN THE CITY: A
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE 57, 64, 110-12 (1971).

14. See Carle, supra note 12, at 271.
15. See Colored School Principal: William L. Bulkley To Be Nominated to Public
School No. 80, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1901, at 2.
16. William L. Bulkley, The Industrial Condition of the Negro in New York City, 27
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 128, 129-31 (1906) (arguing that the existence of a
"caste" system explained employment discrimination against African Americans but
endorsing voluntarist strategies to improve these conditions).
17.

See ANDREW KERSTEN, RACE, JOBS AND THE WAR: THE FEPC IN THE MIDWEST 14-

18(2000).
18.

See ANTHONY S. CHEN, THE FIFTH FREEDOM: JOBS, POLITICS, AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN

THE UNITED STATES, 1941-1972, at 32-87 (2009) (tracing the origins of federal employment

antidiscrimination law to these early FEPCs).
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of perspectives agree, those charged with enforcement of these executive orders
measured compliance by monitoring broad trends, pushing employers to set
hiring goals and time tables, and assessing the bottom line in terms of overall
statistics reflecting employer progress in increasing minority hiring.' 9
The intentional employment discrimination paradigm, focused on proving
acts motivated by discriminatory animus, was by no means the focus of this
early experimental work at the federal level for several reasons. For one, the
orders lacked enforcement mechanisms through which charges of individual
discrimination could be pursued. For another, the goals regulators sought to
achieve as expeditiously as possible depended on many employers making
broad-scale changes to improve their hiring and promotion statistics. Thus
historians who are expert in this area, regardless of their views about the
desirability about this early statistically focused approach, agree: early federal
executive order experiments sought to achieve systemic, structural change.
Motive, individual animus, case-by-case processing-these were all matters
that would become important at a later time when courts became more involved
in adjudicating employment discrimination claims. At the federal level, such
court-based jurisprudence would arise only after enactment of Title VII, a
statute organized around the concept of an individual's right to file a lawsuit in
court.
At the same time that these early, non-judicially supervised legal
experiments were taking place at the federal level through FEPCs, some states
began to push forward with state employment antidiscrimination legislation.
The Ives Quinn Act of 1945 in New York became the first state statute to ban
employment discrimination by private-sector employers. 20 Enforcement of that
act fell to moderate, pro-business Republican regulators, and they, too,
eschewed the individualist, case-by-case prosecutions characteristic of the basic
intentional discrimination paradigm. 21 Indeed, regulators in New York state
hoped to avoid litigation as often as possible in order to escape the potential
limits courts might place on their work.22 Some key regulators, such as New
York State Commission Against Discrimination (SCAD) Chairman Elmer
Anderson Carter, hailed from the National Urban League and clearly borrowed
from that organization's voluntarist philosophy. 23 Carter argued for a regulatory
focus aimed at inducing broad-based change by encouraging employers to
19. See, e.g., id; see also Eileen Boris, Fair Employment and the Origins of
Affirmative Action in the 1940s, 10 NAT'L WOMEN'S STUD. Ass'N J. 142, 142-43 (1998)

(locating the roots of broad-scale, results-focused affirmative action in these first federal
executive orders banning discrimination by government contractors).

20. See generally Anthony S. Chen, "The Hitlerian Rule of Quotas": Racial
Conservatism and the Politics of Fair Employment Legislation in New York State, 1941-

1945, 92 J. AM. HiST. 1238, 1246 (2006) (summarizing activists' intensive coalition-based
campaign to achieve this statute's passage).
21. See Carle, supra note 12, at 279-83.
22. Id.at 282-83.

23. Id.at 279.
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voluntarily assess and reform their employment practices. SCAD also brought
the first disparate impact case as an administrative charge, well before the
24
Court's endorsement of that theory in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., as I will
discuss further below.
In short, at the time of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
intentional discrimination was by no means the established core doctrine. The
picture was much messier. In the minds of regulators and civil rights activists
alike, there was not yet a clear distinction to be drawn between intent- and
effects-based antidiscrimination paradigms. Instead, in the words of one key
of
litigator of the era, Robert Belton, then of the NAACP and now a professor
us]." 25
employment discrimination law: "[i]t was all discrimination [to
The account I have just given is based not only on my own work but also
that of expert employment antidiscrimination law historians writing from a
27
26
variety of political perspectives, including Anthony Chen, Eileen Boris,
Martha Biondi 28 and Paul Moreno.2 9 If accurate, it raises the question as to why
scholars and members of the Court should now assume that intentional
discrimination represents the core of employment antidiscrimination law and
structural or effects-based tests only the periphery or supplement. The answer, I
believe, lies in the common tendency to adopt "presentist" lenses--in other
words, to understand the past through the preoccupations of the present.
Current doctrine emphasizes the difference between effects and intent tests for
discrimination because the Court's 1972 opinion in Washington v. Davis did so
in rejecting a constitutional equal protection claim for employment
discrimination that civil rights litigators filed against a municipal police
department solely on a disparate impact theory. 30 After Washington v. Davis,
litigators ignored the conceptual difference between intent and effects theories
of discrimination at their clients' peril. But it was not always so. The salience
of the line between intent-versus effects-based theories of discrimination is
relatively recent from an historical perspective, especially as viewed from the
perspective of civil rights activists who were long focused on experimenting

24. 401 U.S. 424 (1970).
25. See Selmi, supra note 2, at 723 & n.89. My special thanks to Professor Selmi for
drawing my attention to this quote and discussing its implications with me despite my
somewhat critical response to the article just cited.
26. See CHEN, supra note 18.
27. See Boris, supra note 19.
28.

See MARTHA BIONDI, To STAND AND FIGHT: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN

POSTWAR NEW YORK CITY 100-03 (2003) (describing tension between SCAD and civil rights

activists as to enforcement methods and progress).
29.

See PAUL D.

MORENO, FROM DIRECT ACTION TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: FAIR

EMPLOYMENT LAW AND POLICY IN AMERICA, 1933-1972, at 2 (1997) (tracing origins of
group rights approaches to employment antidiscrimination law, which he disfavors, to the
period between the 1930s and 1950s).
30. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 232-33, 239, 241-42 (1972).
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with structural solutions to problems they perceived as systemic and
institutional.
Similar fallacies underlie the related myth that the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) invented disparate impact doctrine after
passage of Title VII and then improvidently convinced the Court to adopt this
concept in Griggs, a claim Hugh Davis makes in his highly respected book on
the history of Title VII. 31 As already discussed, no one needed to invent the
concept of disparate impact because it predated the 1964 Act. According to two
NAACP cooperating attorneys and law professors, George Cooper and Richard
Sobol, who together wrote an important article outlining the early history of
civil rights lawyers' efforts to litigate employment antidiscrimination
principles, the first disparate impact case clearly recognized as such was
Johnson v. Ritz Hotels, pursued under New York's Ives Quinn Act in 1966.32 In
that case, the Ritz-Carlton denied a job to Mr. Johnson, an African American
applicant with considerable hotel experience, because the hotel had a hiring
policy requiring at least five years of experience in another "East Side" hotel.
Since East Side hotels had traditionally discriminated against African
Americans, the hearing examiner ruled that the Ritz-Carlton's policy was
unenforceable against Mr. Johnson regardless of intent. 33 In other words,
because the policy served to block applicants like Mr. Johnson from
consideration despite their qualifications, it could not be invoked as grounds
against hiring an applicant of Mr. Johnson's acknowledged level of experience.
Thus Shellman Johnson is at least one early administrative case predating
the Court's opinion in Griggs by more than half a decade. The research of
historians of the Ives Quinn Act such as Paul Moreno, a foe of effects-based
doctrine, shows that SCAD was using disparate impact concepts even well
before this, just not in litigated cases. 34 As Neal Devins has pointed out in
seeking to refute Davis's thesis, notions of effects-based approaches to solving
structural inequality were a key aspect of popular discourse in the optimistic,
social reformist heyday of the early 1960s. 35 Many government programs from

31. See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF
NATIONAL POLICY, 1960-1972, at 249-250 (1990) ("[T]he agency was prepared to defy Title

VII's restrictions and attempt to build a body of case law that would justify its focus in
effects.").
32. George Cooper & Richard B. Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under FairEmployment
Laws, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1601 (1969) (discussion of the facts of this case by law

professors who helped formulate the case theory in Griggs); see also Determination after
Investigation at 1-2, Johnson v. Ritz Assocs., Inc., C-12750-66 (on file with author).
33. Cooper & Sobol, supra note 32 at 1601.
34. MORENO, supra note 29, at 117.
35. Neal E. Devins, The Civil Rights Hydra, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1723, 1725, 1729-30
(1991) (critiquing Graham's thesis and arguing that group rights approaches were well
entrenched from the early days of the Kennedy administration).
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War on Poverty, articulated effectsthe 1960s, including President Johnson's
36
ideas.
discrimination
employment
based
Despite the efforts of Devins and others to set the historical record
straight, 37 legends persist about Griggs' supposedly dubious historical pedigree.
These myths can have a pernicious influence on public policy debates about
Title VII's future: If disparate impact doctrine is of marginal legitimacy in light
of longstanding tradition, then it perhaps should not survive searching

constitutional scrutiny, as Justice Scalia recently hinted.38 It is thus worth
correcting the historical record to show that disparate impact doctrine, along

with structural approaches to solving the problems of society-wide
distinguished
discrimination and subordination more generally, has a long and 39

activism.
pedigree arising from moderate, pro-business civil rights
Of course, the fact that commentators are inaccurate in assuming that an

intentional discrimination paradigm was the historically prior preoccupation of
civil rights activists does not mandate any particular conclusion about the
future of civil rights law. But if intentional discrimination is not the historically

prior concept, why should it now assume such a central status, especially if a
longstanding goal of civil rights activism has been to solve problems of
structural subordination? Current statistics show still enormous race-based

disparities in a host of important indicators of human well-being, as other

36. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

232-33 (1968) (recommending that public and private employers remove "[a]rtificial
barriers to employment and promotion," and explaining that "[r]acial discrimination and
unrealistic and unnecessarily high minimum qualifications for employment or promotion
often have the same prejudicial effect"; "[p]resent recruitment procedures should be
reexamined"; and "[t]esting procedures should be revalidated or replaced by work sample or
actual job tryouts.... These procedures have already been initiated in the steel and
telephone industries.")
37. George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact under Title VII An Objective Theory of
Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1344-45 (1987) (arguing that disparate impact was
within Congress's intent in Title VII).
38. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2681-82 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court's
"resolution of this dispute merely postpones the evil day on which the Court will have to
confront the question: Whether, or to what extent, are the disparate-impact provisions of
Title VII ... consistent with the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection?" and citing
Richard A. Prinrus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 493, 585-87 (2003) (questioning the constitutionality of disparate impact doctrine but
then concluding that it is constitutionally permissible in embodying an important "structural
and historical orientation" in this nation's civil rights policy)).
39. See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: White(ning)
Discrimination, Race-ing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73 (2010) (demonstrating
empirically that the city's use of promotion tests with disparate impact disadvantages more
whites than minorities); Lani Guinier & Susan Sturm, Op-Ed., Trial by Firefighters,N.Y.
at
available
A 19,
at
2009,
11,
July
TIMES,
www.nytimes.com/2009/07/11 opinion I I guinier.html (observing that pen and paper tests are
not good predictors of later performance in emergency services jobs).
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participants in this Symposium discuss. 40 These facts prove the need for further
attention to structural or systemic fixes.
II.

MYTH NUMBER Two: FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LAW DEVELOPED PRIMARILY
THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF LAWYERS WHO BROUGHT HIGH-PROFILE TEST
CASE LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS

A second historical misimpression assumes that civil rights law developed
primarily through high visibility impact litigation that lawyers directed in
federal courts. Again, presentist lenses lead to this mistaken assumption:
because we today focus so much on high impact cases, we assume this was
always so. The facts are more complex.
I have already discussed Griggs as an example of this fallacy: The
mistaken claim that the EEOC invented disparate impact doctrine after Title
VII's enactment arises because the early development of this doctrine was not
visible from the vantage point of federal courts. Instead, disparate impact
doctrine arose through the work of moderate, pro-business civil rights leaders
who sought to keep their work away from the courts' disciplinary supervision.
Another example I have already discussed involves the FEPCs established after
A. Philip Randolf threatened to march on Washington to protest federal
contractor race discrimination in World War II. These FEPCs supported early
experiments with goals and time tables for minority hiring and advancement,
41
again outside the scope of judicial supervision.
Traditional legal scholarship does not readily turn up these early
experiments because it tends to focus on case research rather than
foregrounding the activities of lawyers and activists, as I seek to do here. To
scholars using conventional legal research techniques, Griggs does seem to
come out of nowhere, just as effects-based discrimination concepts seem not to
predate Washington v. Davis, because these are the first Supreme Court cases
on point. In fact, the concepts underlying these cases had a much longer
40. See, e.g., Lia B. Epperson, Legislating Inclusion: HarnessingSection 5 Power to
Alleviate RacialIsolation and Increase EducationalOpportunity, 7 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 213

(forthcoming 2011) (noting increasing racial and economic segregation in schools); Danfeng
Soto-Vigil Koon, Cal. Gov't Code § 11135: A Challenge to Contemporary State-Funded

Discrimination, 7 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 239 (forthcoming 2011) (noting large racial
disparities in measures of education and health). John Relman's presentation for the
Symposium likewise highlighted the extreme disproportionate effects of the current
economic recession and mortgage foreclosure crisis on communities of color.
41. See CHEN, supra note 18, at 1-31 (arguing that this lack of court supervision was
the cause of the rise of affirmative action ideas, to which he is opposed). I believe Chen is
wrong in this causal account: affirmative action concepts are rooted in traditional remedial
mechanisms stretching far back in the history of labor law. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §160(c)
(original Wagner Act provision granting the NLRB the power to take "such affirmative
action . . . as will effectuate the policies of this Act"). Nevertheless, his point that use of an
administrative scheme allowed law to develop in directions courts may have blocked is

correct.
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history, just not one visible through the lens of case analysis. Their history
resided in activists' and regulators' experiments in settings distant from the
U.S. Supreme Court, including state agencies, federal commissions that lacked
litigating authority, and regulatory alliances between activists and government
bureaucrats. Sometimes these experiments drew from traditional, litigationeschewed them, and sometimes they
centric views about law, sometimes they
42
ended up producing hybrid approaches.
The history of Griggs is but one example of many long, twisting narratives
of activists' trial-and-error experimentation with both litigation-focused and
litigation-averse strategies for bringing about social change through law. The
many-decades-long history underlying the Court's decision in Brown stands as
yet another example, better known because of the popular focus placed on that
iconic case.43 Similar narratives, starting in local activism and winding through
many intermediate stages of experimentation, have been constructed for other
important civil rights concepts,44 as well as for cases and strategic efforts not
widely recognized as iconic triumphs in the end.45
The common assumption that the best way to develop future civil rights
law is through high-profile cases may often be correct, since this strategy
allows the concentration of effort and expertise. The Dukes v. Wal-Mart classcertification case just decided by the U.S. Supreme Court stands as one such
example, reflecting the costly and intensive efforts of a team of expert
plaintiffs-side employment discrimination litigators, unfortunately with
unsuccessful results.46 Such defeats before the Court have been frequent, but

42. See, e.g., Carle, supra note 12, at 295-96 (discussing productive tensions between
the NAACP and state and federal regulators).
43. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, THE NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED
EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987) (tracing early efforts of NAACP that eventually led to its

litigating strategy in Brown).
44. See generally CIVIL RIGHTS STORIES (Myriam Gills & Risa Goluboff eds., 2007)
(tracing background stories underlying important civil rights cases).
45. See, e.g., SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL
RIGHTS REVOLUTION (forthcoming 2011), Chapter 5 draft (on file with author) (tracing

creative efforts of litigating counsel and amici in the little known case of Andres v. Drew
Municipal Separate School Dist., 371 F. Supp. 27 (N.D. Miss. 1973), which challenged on

race and gender grounds a school district's firing of an employee after discovering her status
as an unwed mother. Rather than grappling with the important issues the case raised, the
U.S. Supreme Court unfortunately dismissed it on the urging of more conservative civil
rights organizations on grounds that certiorari had been improvidently granted.)
46. 564 U.S. _ (2011); see also Walmart Class - Attorney Profiles, available at
http://walmartclass.com/public attorneyprofiles.html (listing counsel associated with this
case); see also Nancy Levit, Megacases, Diversity, and the Elusive Goal of Workplace

Reform, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 367, 379 (2008) ("The last decade
cases brought by individual and isolated plaintiffs' counsel
for plaintiffs' classes, as well as class actions supported
amass foundational support for litigation and offer financial
litigation assistance in complex employment discrimination

has witnessed an evolution from
to repeat players as lead counsel
by advocacy organizations that
support, technical expertise, and
cases"); Robert Fisher, Dukes v.

Wal-Mart: Can 1.5 Million Women Save Employment Discrimination Class Actions?, 12
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civil rights law has continued to develop even in the face of such big defeats.
Many examples show that advances in civil rights principles have come about
through varied, uneven, sometimes circuitous, and highly unpredictable paths.
Thus, while high-profile test case litigation is one important path, both
historically and for the future, it is far from the only fruitful path to pursue
depending on the issue and the social and political context. Especially with
respect to novel principles that may not survive judicial scrutiny in their
tentative infancy, the best strategies for the intermediate-term future may be
ones that remain lower profile, outside the scope of judicial oversight.
Experiments along the lines of the programs Susan Sturm has studied are
examples of such innovations, 47 as are the calls of Michael Dorf, Charles Sabel,
William Simon and others to explore democratic experimentalist techniques for
civil rights litigation and resulting negotiated settlements. As these scholars
explain, democratic experimentalism involves a form of governance in which
"power is decentralized to enable citizens and other actors to utilize their local
knowledge to fit solutions to their individual circumstances.'' 8 In the context of
public impact litigation, law can serve as a background legal threat, motivating
the parties to negotiate solutions to complex institutional reform problems
rather than having such solutions imposed from without. 49 Robin Lehnardt's
excellent article in this Symposium Issue reflects such an experimentalist
sensibility, and I commend that article to readers rather than further belaboring
50
a discussion of democratic experimentalism here.
The mistaken idea that civil rights law developed primarily through high
profile, federal court case litigation leads to the further erroneous assumption
that the principal actors involved were lawyers. In fact, lawyers were not
always the primary movers in the development of civil rights doctrine. This
point has been developed at some length in the part of Tomiko Brown-Nagin's
important new book that examines the relationships during in the height of the
civil rights movement between impatient direct action protestors from the
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the Congress on
Racial Equality (CORE), on the one hand, and Thurgood Marshall and the

CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 1009, 1023-31 (2006) (discussing the development of the case and

the strategic decisions of the coalition of plaintiffs' attorneys).

47. See, e.g., Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace

Equality in Higher Education, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 249 (2006) (studying a project
among several elite science and math faculties that sought to brainstorm new solutions

through internal processes to improve on the hiring and advancement of female faculty
members, and noting the benefits of avoiding judicial scrutiny); see also R.A. Lenhardt,
Localities as Equality Innovators, 7 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 265, 269 (forthcoming 2011)
(discussing Sturm's work).
48. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).
49. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
LitigationSucceeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1067 (2004).
50. Lenhardt, supra note 47.
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NAACP, on the other. 5 1 Marshall sought to apply the brakes to the relatively
uncontrollable trajectory of direct-action protest strategies. He worried that
these strategies could create costly demands for legal defense and derail
decades of cautiously orchestrated test case litigation.
Other historical examples likewise point to the importance of the
contributions of non-lawyers to the development of innovative civil rights
approaches. I will here very briefly discuss two such examples, one based on
my own research and another on a fascinating new dissertation by legal
historian Karen Tani.
The importance of recognizing non-lawyers' contributions to the
development of civil rights law first struck me based on surprises I encountered
in my search for the historical origins of disparate impact law. I expected to
find those origins in the work of civil rights lawyers, probably from the
NAACP, which had by far the most well developed legal operations of the civil
rights organizations in existence during the early twentieth century. 52 Several
facts greatly surprised me as I pursued my research. First, I learned that the
NAACP initially shed private-sector employment issues from its agenda, by
agreeing right after its founding in 1910 to divide its jurisdiction with the nonlaw-focused National Urban League. 53 Second, I discovered that the staff
members of the National Urban League who took up employment
discrimination issues were not lawyers but were instead trained in the social
sciences.54 When these National Urban League leaders began to think seriously
about using legal strategies to combat employment discrimination, they did not
approach the matter from the perspective of lawyers interested in defining a
cause of action through which individuals would have legal recourse. Instead,
these social architects were far more interested in how the backdrop of a legal
mandate could be used to engineer broad-scale voluntary change in the
practices of employers. Their approach bore the marks of problem-solving by
persons trained in social science disciplines, aimed at inducing systemic change
through education and public awareness campaigns. 55 Far from being skeptical
about businesses' motives, these moderate civil rights leaders were probusiness, often carrying Republican credentials. 6 Rather than compelling
employers to undertake specific practices by litigating against them, these
National Urban League figures wanted to induce employers to self-scrutinize
51. See TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG
HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 133-304 (2011).

52. See generally Susan D. Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP

(1910-1920), 20 LAW & HiST. REV. 97, 106-15 (2002) (describing the composition and
activities of the NAACP's first national legal committee).
53. NANCY J. WEIS, THE NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, 1910-1940, at 65-66 (1974).
54. On the social science backgrounds and methods of many National Urban League
leaders, see TOURt F. REED, NOT ALMS BUT OPPORTUNITY: THE URBAN LEAGUE AND THE

POLITICS OF RACIAL UPLIFT, 1910-1950, at 14-15, 17-19 (2008).

55. See Carle, supra note 12, at 280 (describing SCAD's focus on public education).
56. Id. at 278-79.

Oct. 2011]

MYTH-BUSTING

and modify their employment practices while preserving their business
flexibility and discretion.
A second example of the importance of non-lawyers' contributions to the
development of civil rights law comes from legal historian Karen Tani's
dissertation in progress entitled "Securing a Right to Welfare: Public
Assistance Administration and the Rule of Law, 1938-1960." In a beautifully
researched conference paper presented at the 2010 American Society for Legal
History Annual Meeting, Tani explores the tension that existed within the New
Deal Public Assistance Administration between lawyer and social worker
approaches to defining a legal right to public assistance. 57 Lawyers thought
about these questions in legalistic terms while the social workers within the
agency thought about them according to the professional norms they had
inherited through their socialization into a different professional discipline.
From the social workers' perspective, public assistance should be thought about
as a right based in human need, not as charity or a limited legalistic entitlement.
In the end, the lawyers' views won out and the social workers' perspective
faded from view, for a number of reasons related to the changing politics of the
nation. But Tani's careful research captures the alternative voice of a distinct
professional discourse community that would have recognized basic
subsistence as a human right and thus altered the nation's discourse legacy on
economic and social welfare issues.
These several examples, drawn from different historical eras, show how
civil rights principles have and could have developed not only, or even
primarily, through the work of lawyers, but also through the interactions--often
in the form of strained tensions-between lawyers and other actors steeped in
different discourse traditions. Those different traditions could be the product of
training in different professional disciplines or immersion in different
experiential traditions, as in the tension between direct action protestors and
Marshall and the LDF during the zenith of the civil rights movement. 58 Such
tensions have produced synergies resulting in new directions in the
development of civil rights law that would not have occurred had lawyers been
working in isolation: The National Urban League thought about the potential of
state antidiscrimination law in experimental terms, emphasizing its promise in
shaping the conduct of a large employer community by inducing self-study to
search for ways to improve minority hiring and advancement without a heavy
reliance on the intervention of courts; the social workers within the Public
Assistance Administration emphasized the importance of determining access to
assistance based on need rather than formally defined legal entitlement; the
57. Karen M. Tani, "Legal Rights and Human Needs in New Deal Welfare

Administration" (unpublished paper on file with author).
58. BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 51, at 133-304; see also TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE
WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 175 (1988) (discussing tension between Thurgood
Marshall and the NAACP, on the one hand, and Martin Luther King, Jr., and the direct
action protestors he inspired, on the other).
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leaders of SNCC and CORE eschewed the court-centered strategies of the
NAACP in favor of more dramatic techniques that would call the nation's
attention to the struggle for racial justice with an urgency that drawn out
proceedings within court house walls could not match.
I have elsewhere written about the potential dangers of undue lawyer
59
domination of social change movements. Historical examples abound. The
tight grip of relatively conservative and privileged white lawyers over the
NAACP's very early reform agenda is one example of this problem. As Elliott
Rudwick and August Meier have shown, it took a leadership takeover within
the NAACP by a new generation of mostly African American leaders to set the
NAACP on its brilliant mid-century path, in which it exploited the tiny crevices
available for the exercise of political agency to move the country in the
A clash of perspectives can be seen
direction of improved racial justice.
within other early twentieth century social reform organizations as well.
National Consumers League leader Florence Kelley's agenda for social welfare
reform sometimes clashed with the views of Louis Brandeis and other lawyeradvisors. 6 1 Such historical examples counsel against lawyer domination and
lawyer-centric idea generation about directions for reform. Law-centered
reform strategies have benefits and strengths, but downsides and weaknesses as
well.
These lessons suggest that a fruitful way to generate ideas for future civil
rights directions would be to share perspectives across professional discourse
traditions. The emphasis on new collaborative models for social change
62
lawyering represents just this kind of productive new thinking, as does the
push for reform of multidisciplinary practice strictures for the legal profession

59. See Susan Carle, Re-envisioning Models for Pro Bono Lawyering: A Comparative
Study of the Early NAACP and the National Consumers League, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL'Y &L. 81 (2001).
60. August Meier & Elliott Rudwick, Attorneys Black and White: A Case Study of
Race Relations within the NAACP, in ALONG THE COLOR LINE: EXPLORATIONS INTHE BLACK
EXPERIENCE (August Meier & Elliott Rudwick eds., 1976); August Meier and Elliott
Rudwick, The Rise of the Black Secretariat, in id., at 109-11. The metaphor of exploiting
tiny crevices comes from a presentation by historian John Bracey at the Organization for
American History Annual Meeting in Seattle, Washington, in May 2009.
61. Carle, supra note 59, at 90-92 (discussing the role of lawyers in controlling the
agenda of the National Consumers League).
62. See, e.g., Amy Killelea, CollaborativeLawyering Meets CollaborativeDoctoring:
How a MultidisciplinaryPartnershipfor HIVIAIDS Services Can Improve Outcomes for the
Marginalized Sick, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 413 (2009) (arguing for cross
disciplinary approaches to address the intersection of health care law and poverty); Barbara
Glesner Fines, Ethical Issues in CollaborativeLawyering, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW.

141 (2008) (noting many versions of collaborative lawyering and addressing the need for
more examination of them); Ascanio Piomelli, Appreciating Collaborative Lawyering, 6
CLINICAL L. REV. 427 (2000) (exploring the history and various strains of collaborative
lawyering theory).
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generally. 63 In antidiscrimination law, more effort is being made to draw on the
perspectives of other professional disciplines, including organizational
psychology, sociology, cognitive science, economics, business management,
applied mathematics, and other fields. 64 Lessons of the past suggest that such
collaboration should include attention to translating perspectives drawn from
sometimes incompatible professional disciplines for the courts, because courts
65
can prove quite hostile to, or at least skeptical about, non-law based ideas.
Alternatively, collaborative cross-disciplinary efforts could consider
developing strategies for social change that do not rely heavily on resort to
courts.
A final, related lesson arising from study of civil rights history questions
civil rights lawyers' tendency to focus on causes of action vindicated by filing
lawsuits in court. In my project investigating the early history of disparate
impact analysis, for example, I noticed that early NAACP litigators held this
view, frequently showing skepticism about enforcement schemes other than
court-based litigation. 66 That they took this stance is completely understandable
given the historical context: state courts and administrative schemes often had
not proven friendly to civil rights claims, while federal court cases had
produced at least a few more promising developments. 67 But too great a focus
on this standard story minimizes the evidence that legal change occurred in
many forums, not all of them federal courts. When the U.S. Supreme Court
invalidated major portions of the Reconstruction -era civil rights statutes in the
1883 Civil Rights Cases,68 for example, civil rights activists in the North turned
to state legislatures to enact civil rights protections and filed test cases in state

63. See, e.g., Paul Paton, Multidisciplinary Practice Redux: Globalization, Core
Values, and Reviving the MDP Debate in America, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2198 (2010);
Louise G. Trubek & Jennifer J. Farnham, Social Justice Collaboratives: Multidisciplinary
Practicesfor the People, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 227 (2000).
64. See, e.g., Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, The Architecture of Inclusion:
Evidence From Corporate Diversity Programs, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 279 (2007)
(analyzing corporations' diversity initiatives through the lens of sociology); Debra Meyerson
& Megan Tompkins, Tempered Radicals as Institutional Change Agents: The Case of
Advancing Gender Equity at the University of Michigan, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 303
(2007) (analyzing the same issues using theory from the field of organizational studies);
Richard R.W. Brooks & Valerie Purdie-Vaughns, The Supermodular Architecture of
Inclusion, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 379 (2007) (using economics to predict conditions for
diversity hiring).
65. Cf Charles Kester, The Language of Law, the Sociology of Science and the
Troubles of Translation: Defining the ProperRole for Scientific Evidence of Causation, 74
NEB. L. REV. 529, 556-61 (1995) (noting the difficulties of translating scientific concepts
into legal concepts in proving causation).
66. See Carle, supra note 12, at 281 & nn. 180-84.
67. See generally KLARMAN, supra note 9 (describing development of civil rights law
over the course of the twentieth century with a heavy emphasis on federal court litigation).
68. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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70
The
courts, 69 facts often overlooked in standard historical accounts.
permitted
Act
Quinn
Ives
the
under
up
set
scheme
administrative enforcement
civil rights regulators to experiment with structural approaches to employment
antidiscrimination law that probably went beyond what state courts would have
permitted, as already discussed.
Another important example comes from Sophia Lee's investigation of the
NAACP's work in the 1940s and 1950s before the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB). 7 1 Lee traces how the NAACP pursued unfair labor charges and
duty of fair representation claims before the NLRB in order to promote
recognition of unions' legal duty not to discriminate on the basis of race. She
explains that the NAACP's decision to pursue this route was motivated not
only by legal considerations but also by political perspective: Labor Director
Herbert Hill wanted to work with the labor movement whenever possible and to
encourage African American union membership because he "viewed the labor
movement, not litigation, as the preferred vehicle for producing" change in
72
The NAACP "sought to facilitate
African American workers' situations.
73
and wanted to develop constitutional
class-based collective action,
nondiscrimination principles within the agency that oversaw collective labor
representation.
Lee shows how the NAACP's carefully orchestrated labor strategy under
Hill in the 1950s produced, after much effort and perseverance, a major
administrative law victory when the NLRB announced an expansive reading of
the state action doctrine in a key NLRB case.74 For a time at least, this victory
prompted the NLRB to vigorously police labor union discrimination. In later
years, the Board's vigilance decreased, frustrating Hill and causing the
75
NAACP's workplace constitutionalism to "fade out" by the late 1970s. But
Lee's research nevertheless shows that administrative law strategies were
important in reaching civil rights goals related to securing desirable, wellpaying jobs for African American workers.

69. See, e.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, §§ 42i-42j (1887) (nondiscrimination in public
accommodations statute); Davis v. Euclid Ave. Garden Theatre Co., 17 Ohio C.C. 495, 49597 (1911) (holding a theater owner liable under a similar Ohio public accommodations law
after his agent refused to sell a ticket to an African American); Du Bois, THE PHILADELPHIA
NEGRO 418 (Cosmo Books ed. 2007) (1899) (citing the 1887 Pennsylvania Civil Rights Act).
70. For example, Klarman argues that in the late nineteenth century African Americans
continued to unsuccessfully litigate because of an absence of viable alternatives, but does not
sufficiently discuss the modest victories that were made through statutory initiatives and
litigation at the state level. See KLARMAN, supra note 9, at 58.
71. Sophia Z. Lee, Hotspots in a Cold War: The NAACP's Postwar Workplace
Constitutionalism,1948-1964, 26 LAW & HiST. REv. 327 (2008).
72. Id. at 344, 348.
73. Id. at 331.
74. Hughes Tool, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
75. Lee, supra note 71, at 375.
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It may be that future civil rights directions should, in some situations,
likewise focus on strategies other than the creation of federal, court-based
causes of action. While I am not arguing that federal causes of action are
unimportant, I am suggesting more agnosticism about preferable designs for
civil rights protections. Many creative ideas could be explored. In the
employment context, for example, it does not stretch the bounds of theoretical
or even political plausibility to consider establishing workplace-based tribunals
as a forum of first recourse for employment discrimination along with other
kinds of workplace unfairness claims, as legal systems in some other countries
do. 7 6 Despite some civil rights advocates' traditional aversion to such ideas, it
is worth imagining the establishment of an administrative agency with powers
more robust than those currently possessed by the EEOC to handle civil rights
matters, either as limited to employment discrimination or under a new system
that would consolidate various areas of civil rights concern. 77 I am not
especially advocating any of these ideas but simply suggesting that they should
remain on the table in brainstorming about future civil rights directions, out of a
recognition of both the benefits and drawbacks of federal, judicially policed,
private cause-of-action enforcement schemes.
At the same time, civil rights advocates should avoid the opposite tendency
of some recent civil rights scholars to jump from empirical evidence showing
that plaintiffs are unjustly failing to prevail in antidiscrimination cases to
conclusions that the laws in question are a failure and should be abandoned. 78 If
plaintiffs are not prevailing in court despite indicators showing continuing legal
violations, the appropriate question is why plaintiffs are not winning
meritorious cases. Possibilities of jury and court bias come to mind, as well as
problems with the construction of burdens of proof or other procedural or
substantive legal roadblocks. In the case of disparate impact claims, for
example, virtually all commentators agree that such cases are exceedingly
difficult to maintain because of the difficult threshold showing for the prima
facie case. This threshold requires not only sophisticated proof of a statistically
significant disparity between groups on the basis of a protected characteristic,
but also highly specific proof of the particular employment practice producing
that disparity. 79 Indeed, a recent Supreme Court case discussing the showing
76. See,
e.g.,
National
Labour
Profile:
South
Africa,
available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/info/national/sa.htm#9 (describing system
of labor laws and remedies in South Africa).
77. See, e.g., Leroy D. Clark, The Future Civil Rights Agenda: Speculation on
Litigation, Legislation, and Organization,38 CATH. U. L. REv. 795, 817 (1989) (arguing that
the EEOC should be granted power to conduct administrative hearings and issue cease and

desist orders as the National Labor Relations Board is empowered to do).
78. See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 2.
79. See,

e.g.,

Elaine

W.

Shoben,

Disparate Impact Theory in Employment

Discrimination: What's Griggs Still Goodfor? What Not?, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 597, 597-98
(2004) (noting that disparate impact cases "are difficult, if not impossible, for private
plaintiffs to undertake").
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required to identify a "particular employment practice" suggests new
expectations of precision and detail that may stump even the most expert
80
industrial psychologists.
These problems are serious and require solution. They do not, however,
suggest that the entire enterprise of seeking non-blame based solutions to
employment discrimination should be abandoned. Even imperfectly working
laws-indeed, even miserably inadequate laws-can be much better than no
legal proscription at all, such as permitting employers to freely use
exclusionary employee selection devices, which would be the state of the law if
disparate impact analysis were abandoned.
Statutory prescriptions are important in part because law serves functions
other than providing causes of action a plaintiff may vindicate in court. Law
also shapes behavior. This is what former NUL leader and SCAD
commissioner Elmer Anderson Carter thought the Ives Quinn Act could do
goals for SCAD, Ives Quinn gave
best. As he argued in an article describing 8 his
1
employers an excuse to do the right thing.
Law can also have important incentive-producing effects. This is one of the
insights of Susan Sturm's pathbreaking article on solving "second generation"
employment discrimination challenges. To illustrate her point, Sturm uses the
Supreme Court's construction of an affirmative defense to vicarious liability for
supervisor sexual harassment. Sturm suggests that this affirmative defense
allowed the Court to create a legal incentive to encourage employers to
establish internal sexual harassment prevention and investigation policies,
an employer from
because implementation of such policies would immunize
83
vicarious liability in supervisory sexual harassment cases.
Similarly, I have argued elsewhere that the civil rights bar should not
completely despair about the Court's opinion in Ricci--and certainly should
not consider abandoning disparate impact analysis, as some have arguedbecause even though that decision makes it appreciably harder for plaintiffs to
prevail on disparate impact claims, it still preserves an incentive for employers
to seek professional validation of employment selection and promotion devices

80. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005) (holding that the plaintiffs
failed to identify with sufficient precision the exact "practice" that caused disparate impact
on the basis of age in a city's formula for raising the salaries of junior public safety officers
to compete with other jurisdictions).
81. See Elmer A. Carter, PracticalConsiderationsofAnti-DiscriminationLegislation:
Experience Under the New York Law Against Discrimination,40 CORNELL L.Q. 40, 41, 50
(1954) (describing "tremendous significance in the administration of the new statute ... of
individual employers [that] voluntarily abandon previous discriminatory hiring practices"
and stating his view that the only hope for elimination of "pandemic" discrimination in the
United States "lies in the extent to which voluntary compliance with the provisions of the
law can be achieved").
82. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 479-521 (2001).
83. Id.
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in order to avoid potential liability under Ricci's new standard requiring goodfaith conduct by employers.84
Of course, one can argue that the incentives created by legal rules have
been set too low or are otherwise not effective. I have raised such a query about
the Court's affirmative defense for sexual harassment vicarious liability, noting
that a survey of court cases suggests that many courts tend to rubber stamp
employer sexual harassment policies without a sufficiently searching inquiry
into those policies' adequacy. 85 Likewise, civil rights advocates have
eloquently argued that Ricci creates far too wide a safe harbor for employers
against disparate impact liability. 86 These arguments, however, go to questions
of how to construct effective incentives through law, not to whether incentive
creation is an important function of law in the first place.
Thus when it comes to legal rules, sometimes even a quarter of a glass, or
even an eighth of a glass, is better than an empty one. Given the extremely
hard-fought battles that have been waged to get even these quarter-glass-full
solutions, it seems important to protect grossly imperfect civil rights laws from
being dismantled wherever possible, even if they are not working as well as
hoped.
A tendency to downplay the importance of the less-than-perfect victories of
the civil rights movement characterizes some currently popular critiques of the
accomplishments of that movement in other respects as well. I turn to the
historical myths on which such critiques are based, and the fallacies they tend
to introduce into forward-looking civil rights thinking, in Part III below.
III. MYTH

NUMBER THREE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT UNDULY FOCUSED
ON A "LEGAL LIBERALIST" AGENDA

In the wake of the fifty-year anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education,
it has become popular to critique that case, and the American civil rights
movement in general, for pursuing a so-called "legal liberalist" agenda. In the
words of one leading legal historian, Ken Mack, legal liberalism's core
elements include: "courts as the primary engines of social transformation;
formal conceptual categories such as rights and formal remedies such as school
desegregation decrees, as the principal mechanisms for accomplishing that
change; and a focus on reforming public institutions (or, in some versions,
public and private institutions without much distinction) as a means of

84. Carle, supra note 12, at 299. On Ricci's good faith standard, see Joseph A. Seiner
& Benjamin N. Gutman, Does Ricci Herald a New Disparate Impact?, 90 B.U. L. REV.
2181,2204-07, 2213 (2010).
85. See Susan Carle, Acknowledging Informal Power Dynamics in the Workplace: A
Proposalfor FurtherDevelopment of the Vicarious Liability Doctrine in Sexual Harassment
Cases, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 85 (2006).
86. See, e.g., Seiner & Gutman, supra note 83.
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transforming the larger society. ' 87 The legal liberalist critique of the civil rights
movement argues that civil rights lawyers and other activists erred in
overemphasizing the importance of "formal" equality rather than pursuing
that would improve the everyday material conditions of people's
changes
88
lives.
This critique of the so-called legal liberalist agenda of the civil rights
movement has produced a counter-critique, which points out that the goals and
accomplishments of the civil rights movement were far richer than a legal
liberalist gloss assumes. In his important article on mid-tWentieth-century civil
rights lawyering, for example, Mack shows that African American civil rights
lawyers' goals were far from legal liberalist ones. They were instead strongly
89
influenced by a long tradition of effort aimed at intra-group advancement.
Another trend, which Mack focuses on less but which to me also deserves
emphasis, was a commitment to broad-scale social reform extending beyond
racial justice and embracing the restructuring of resource distribution for all. As
Mack does note, many leading African American lawyers committed to the
pursuit of racial justice issues in the inter-war era, such as Charles Hamilton
Houston and Raymond Alexander, were socialists or similar economic radicals,
willing to90work with organizations far to the left on the American political
spectrum.
This tradition of combining racial justice concerns with a commitment to
economic justice for all persons regardless of race has long roots, tracing back
to a founding period in the late nineteenth century in which basic principles that
would guide nationally coordinated civil rights activism throughout the
twentieth century were first being worked out. In that period, civil rights
activists clearly articulated a vision of racial justice activism that spanned both
political and civil rights and economic and social welfare concerns.
I have previously investigated the thought and activism of one civil rights
leader during this founding era: T. Thomas Fortune, who founded the first
nonpartisan national civil rights organization intended to have permanent
status, which he named the Afro American League (AAL). 9 1 Fortune was a
law-trained newspaper editor and public intellectual, who in the first half of his
87. Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era
Before Brown, 115 YALE L.J. 256, 258 (2005).
88. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Brown As Icon, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S ToP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S LANDMARK

CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 3, 12 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) ("In the half century since Brown, it
is clear that although the elimination of Jim Crow has done much good, blacks as a group

still lag behind whites in many of the most important social measures of well-being and
success-household income, infant mortality, life expectancy, educational opportunity, and
employment levels.").

89. Id.; August Meier traces this strain of African American civil rights thought in
AUGUST MEIER, NEGRO THOUGHT IN AMERICA, 1880-1915, at 121-60 (1963).
90. Mack, supra note 87, at 344-45.
91. See Carle, supra note I1, at 1482.
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life served as a visionary theorist of strategies for achieving racial justice, and
broader social justice as well.92 Many of the ideas he propounded became
tenets of early civil rights organizations that set the agenda for twentieth93
century civil rights activism.
Fortune saw the problem of racial injustice as requiring a two-pronged
strategy. On the one hand, Fortune saw the need for court-based political and
civil rights litigation. He was not optimistic about convincing the courts to
enforce the principles of equality of citizenship rights that supposedly underlay
the country's constitution, but he thought this fight should take place anyway, if
only to expose the courts for their hypocrisy and to shame the country in the
eyes of the world. 94 In the mid-1880s, two Baltimore-based lawyers active in a
regional civil rights organization called the Brotherhood of Liberty-which
was engaging in test-case litigation along with other strategies-published an
analysis in Fortune's newspaper of the potential for test case litigation to
provide a national civil rights organization-building strategy. 95 Fortune appears
to have taken these ideas strongly to heart and wrote frequently in the pages of
his newspaper about litigation taking place on transportation and public
accommodations segregation, even becoming a plaintiff in such a case
himself.96 A study of Fortune and the AAL is thus illuminating in showing the
origins of ideas about using the framework of a national civil rights
organization to support litigation pursuing political and civil rights issues in the
courts, all several decades before the founding of the NAACP.
But a study of Fortune's thought is even more interesting for what it
reveals about matters Fortune thought were equally pressing to the project of
racial justice but not amenable to litigation-based solutions. As important to
Fortune as political and civil rights reform was fundamental economic and
social restructuring. Fortune saw such restructuring as key to racial justice in
the long term, and further saw the most pressing issue-even more important
than racial justice-to be economic justice, or the elimination of stark
disparities between the haves and the have-nots regardless of race. 97 Fortune
understood that such overall economic restructuring could not occur except as
the result of coalition-based democratic politics uniting constituencies of
similar economic interests across race lines. Fortune was as strikingly
optimistic about the chances of such sweeping political transformation as he
was pessimistic about the use of courts to achieve civil rights gains.

92. In his middle age years Fortune became associated with Booker T. Washington
and, weighed down with financial anxieties and a condition that might today be diagnosed as
manic depression, lost his status as a vanguard civil rights leader. Id. at 1485.
93. Id. at 1524-33.
94. Id. at 1507, 1516.
95. Id. at 1483 & n.14, 1519-20.
96. Id. at 1523.
97. Id. at 1502-07.
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As evidence that building such a coalition-based political movement aimed
at economic change was possible, Fortune pointed to the Knights of Labor
movement, which was rapidly expanding based on a racially egalitarian labororganizing philosophy. The Knights of Labor emphasized the potential of labor
organizing to achieve political change, and stood in contrast to a trade union
model of interest-group bargaining, which would become the prevailing
ideology of the U.S. labor movement in a slightly later period. 98
By the late 1890s, however, the Knights of Labor had collapsed and a
racially exclusionary trade-union-organizing model had taken its place, led by
Samuel Gompers of the American Federation of Labor.99 These developments
disappointed the hopes of Fortune and other civil rights activists of like
political bent, though similar ideas continued to influence civil rights activism
long into the future, as the work of Goluboff, Lee and many other historians
shows. Although today Fortune's political vision appears naive, it remains
important in showing that the political and civil rights aspects of racial-justice
strategies were long conceived as existing side-by-side with an economic and
social reform agenda.
A focus on dual sides to the struggle for racial justice-on both political
and civil rights and economic and social welfare reform--is evident throughout
the twentieth-century history of the civil rights movement. Just as civil rights
activism has historically involved a focus on racial justice in many dimensions,
there is no reason such multi-dimensional perspectives should not continue to
drive future directions. It is worth quickly summarizing some of the recent
historical scholarship uncovering this rich, multi-dimensional history because
of the light it sheds on future possibilities.
One important scholar on this topic is Risa Goluboff, who has convincingly
traced the NAACP's work on matters related to economic justice in the
1940s. 100 As Goluboff explains, in the 1930s and 1940s:
... civil rights law barely resembled the field as we now know it. In particular,
both laypeople and legal professionals included not only the rights with which
we associate the term today but also collective labor rights to governmentally
provided economic security and affirmative rights to material and economic

98. Id. at 1503-06.
99. See, e.g., Bernard Mandel, Samuel Gompers and the Negro Workers, 1886-1914,
40 J. NEGRO HiST. 34, 53-60 (1955) (tracing the rise of Jim Crow thinking by the American
Federation of Labor and its President Samuel Gompers).
100. See, e.g., RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007).
Goluboff emphasizes the civil rights movement's interest in these years on developing
litigation theories to boost economic as well as political and civil rights. See, e.g., id at 6
(explaining that her book will explore the potential of black workers' claims "to spur the
creation of new civil rights doctrines"); id. at 13 (the book's goal is "to highlight the
consequences of lawyers' strategic litigation choices about which cases to pursue and which
to avoid, which harms to emphasize and which to ignore .. "); id. at 14 (lawyers should not
only have established "norm[s] of racial nondiscrimination" but also "rights to work, to join
a union, to participate in the labor market, to minimal subsistence").
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equality. Contemporaries saw an explicit connection between discrimination
and economics, rights and reform, individual entitlement and government
obligation. Lawyers who took the cases of black workers treated as civil rights
issues labor-based and economic harms as well as racial ones, and they placed
responsibility
for rights protection within government as well as in opposition
°
to it. 0

Goluboff focuses primarily on NAACP and U.S. Department of Justice
litigation efforts aimed at economic rights issues. Other legal scholars have
pushed Goluboff's discoveries even further by investigating the non-litigationfocused initiatives of the NAACP. Sophia Lee, as already discussed, shows this
02
breadth in the NAACP's work extending into the 1950s.1
Still other important work demonstrating the breadth of civil rights
leaders' strategies abounds. Carol Anderson's Eyes Off the Prize shows the
NAACP's efforts to use the principles of international human rights law to
pursue its domestic civil rights agenda. 10 3 Although this NAACP campaign
suffered defeat due to a lack of sufficient support by key actors including
Eleanor Roosevelt, Anderson's work shows yet another creative and bold
experiment in varied methods of providing pressure to bring about improved
racial justice, this time using the international human rights paradigm.
Similarly, Tomiko Brown-Nagin's new book already discussed, as well as
her prior work, has emphasized how socio-economic class issues affected civil
rights activists' strategies. In tracing the clash of perspectives between a new
generation of radical lawyers and other militants who led the SNCC directaction sit-ins in Atlanta in the 1960s on the one hand, and older generations of
race-activist lawyers on the other, Brown-Nagin demonstrates that neither of
these generations held views about the relationship between courts and social
change resembling the legal liberalist caricature. Her story is instead far more
complex and interesting, exploring not only intergenerational conflict but also
class and gender differences within the movement. Thus Brown-Nagin's initial
focus is on Atlanta from the 1940s through the direct-action protests of the
1950s and 1960s. She then continues her examination of activism in that city
through the 1970s, depicting the African American women involved in welfare
rights organizing and the relationship of that work to the civil rights activism
10 4
that came before it.
Still another voice is that of Athena Mutua, who in the course of describing
the Northeastern University School of Law Project on Civil Rights and
Restorative Justice, argues for conceiving of "the civil rights era" as beginning

101. Id. at 5.
102. Lee, supra note 71.
103. CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE PRIZE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE AFRICAN
AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 1944-1955 (2003).

104. See BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 51.
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radical agenda.1
in the 1930s and continuing to pursue a still unfinished
Mutua concludes that:
... [T]he abbreviated story of the civil rights movement cuts it off from its
roots in the protest activism of the 1930s and its wings in the black power
movement. In doing so it not only excludes a host of people involved in the
movement, people who passed their traditions on to future generations, but it
guts the movement of its central message and goal of a broad egalitarian
democratic order. That is, the movement recognized that both slavery and Jim
Crow, as well as today's oppressive racial isolation, were not just racial
systems meant to oppress and offend human dignity but also economic
systems meant to facilitate the exploitation of black labor, to deny black
created by
material well-being, and to assist the few in hoarding the resources
106
the many including th[ose] created by black people as a whole.
Other interesting work exploring alternate strands of civil rights activism
includes Thomas Jackson's tracing of the ways in which Martin Luther King,
Jr. was working to connect ideas concerning racial justice with ideas
1° 7
Nikhil Pal Singh argues that the
concerning substantive economic justice.
standard narrative of the civil rights movement "fails to recognize the historical
depth and heterogeneity of black struggles against racism, narrowing the
political scope of black agency and reinforcing a formal, legalistic view of
black equality."' 1 8 Focusing on the 1930s and after, Singh points to an
internationalist group of black intellectuals who analyzed the connections
between colonialism and racism, and further notes that "blacks were the one
political constituency that consistently supported the expansion of social as
well as civil rights, or the development of a full-employment welfare-state in
the United States." 10 9
In short, a large quantity of recent scholarship has made it abundantly clear
that rich strains of thought and activism existed throughout the history of the
civil rights movement that were connected with economic and social welfare
concerns, class analysis and awareness, and the articulation of a rights
discourse embracing far more than a negative nondiscrimination principle. The
critique of legal liberalism as the dominant paradigm of the movement for
racial justice is another myth that threatens to perniciously influence visions of
the future by placing restrictive blinders on views of the past. Awareness of a
far richer, more diverse, highly experimental past can point the way to a

105. Athena D. Mutua, Restoring Justice to Civil Rights Movement Activists?: New
at
available
Era",
Rights
Civil
"Long
the
and
Historiography
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= I000&context-athenamutua.
Id.at 52.
107. THOMAS F. JACKSON, FROM CIVIL RIGHTS TO HUMAN RIGHTS: MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR., AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC JUSTICE (2007) (exploring Martin Luther King,
106.

Jr.'s efforts to reclaim and further develop ideas connecting racial and economic justice).
108. NIKHIL PAL SINGH, BLACK IS A COUNTRY: RACE AND THE UNFINISHED STRUGGLE
FOR DEMOCRACY 6 (2004).

109. Id. at 48, 54.
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similarly rich and experimentalist future, which continues to embrace ambitious
goals and refuses to be constrained by an awareness that some important goals,
especially the lessening of economic inequality and hardship, have not yet been
achieved. In thinking ahead to the future for civil rights law and policy, it may
be that these unattained, but nevertheless historically prominent, goals require
the most attention. Rather than running from as yet unsolved problems of vast
economic disparities corresponding with (but not limited to) racial lines in our
society, it may be that the future of civil rights activism should emphasize these
areas of as yet unfulfilled concern.
IV. MYTH NUMBER FOUR: EFFORTS TO ADDRESS SOCIAL RESOURCE
INEQUALITIES THROUGH CIVIL RIGHTS LAW HAVE LARGELY FAILED AND ARE
DOOMED TO FAIL DUE TO THE LIMITS OF LAW IN REACHING PRIVATE SOCIAL
ORDERINGS

The fourth and final myth I want to rebut relates to what I will call a
"depressive turn" in civil rights scholarship. Legal scholars as varied as Derrick
Bell, Jr., Michael Klarman, and Sam Bagenstos have engaged in this depressive
turn. 1 ° The despair about disparate impact law discussed above is one example
of it, but there are a great many others. Most generally described, this
depressive turn looks at the many failures of attempts to achieve broad-scale
structural reform through law and suggests that legal engineering cannot
achieve such desired broad-scale or structural reforms.
There is, of course, much evidence to support the conclusions of these and
other accomplished scholars pointing out the less-than-effective results of many
legal reform efforts in the civil rights arena. Pollyannaish optimism or a refusal
to deal with the problems of unintended consequences that bedevil all legal
reform efforts, no matter how well intentioned, certainly do not help advance
the cause of social justice. Certainly many very bad results have been produced

110. See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 9, at 385-442 (arguing that Brown was
counterproductive because it produced a ferocious backlash that slowed down change that
would have happened through other means); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and
the Limits of AntidiscriminationLaw, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006) (arguing that "[t]here is
little reason to believe that a structural approach to employment discrimination law will
actually be successful."); Derrick Bell, Jr., Diversity's Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1622, 1633 (2003) (arguing that civil rights campaigns intended to remedy racial barriers
usually provide more benefit to whites than blacks); Derrick Bell, Jr., The Unintended
Lessons in Brown v. Board of Education, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1053, 1056 (2004-2005)
("Brown was not a revolutionary decision. Rather, it is the definitive example that the
interest of blacks in achieving racial justice is accommodated only when and for so long as
policymakers find that the interest of blacks converges with the political and economic
interests of whites."); id. at 1059 ("Even when interest convergence results in a potentially
effective racial remedy, that remedy will be abrogated as soon as it threatens the superior
societal status of whites, particularly those in the middle and upper classes."); Derrick Bell,
Jr., Racial Realism, 24 CoNN. L. REV. 363, 375-78 (1992) (arguing that civil rights law and
racial equality ideology will never change the permanent subordinate status of blacks).
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by well meaning but misguided efforts at reform. At the same time, there can
be significant, and ultimately destructive, normative consequences to the
depressive turn in civil rights scholarship, just as there are normative
consequences to all descriptive projects." l ' The descriptive conclusion that no
good has been achieved as the result of prior efforts at social reform produces
the normative conclusion that nothing ought to be tried, because such efforts
never produce improvements, and may produce a worse state of affairs than
originally existed. Such broad conclusions lead to a state of apathy or
resignation worse than a failed experiment. 112 Imagine a country in which the
NAACP had not fought its many civil rights campaigns. While critical scholars
of
have become fond of attacking the hagiographic "legal liberalist" retelling 114
113 and while their critiques have an important point,
the NAACP's victories,
a world without efforts at social reform would surely be a far less just world
overall than one in which activists have tried, often unsuccessfully, to achieve
such results. Should the NAACP have litigated Brown or should it not have
done so? That is a debate some scholars relish.' 1 5 To me it seems a less than
fruitful question, since assessments of what alternatives were open at the time
requires a kind of counterfactual speculation that can never be conclusive.116
But the question whether civil rights activists should have bothered to try to
achieve broad-scale social change through the wide variety of experiments in
which they engaged seems to me to require a definitive answer in the
affirmative. A mature balance of cautious skepticism, on the one hand, and
tenacious willingness to forge ahead, on the other, appears preferable to

111. See John Dewey, Theory of Valuation, in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
UNIFIED SCIENCE 1, 33 (exploring relationship between descriptive and normative inquiry in
social science research).
112. See, e.g., Joel F. Handler, Post-modernism, Protest, and the New Social
Movements, 26 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 697, 719-28 (1992) (criticizing post-modernist activism
for failing to attempt sustained, large-scale political change).
113. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, The Racial Double Helix: Watson,
Crick, and Brown v. Board of Education (Our No-Bell Prize Award Speech), 47 How. L.J.
473, 492 (2004) (critiquing traditional understandings of Brown).
114. For example, economic indicators show that on some key measures persons of
color as a group in the United States today are faring even worse relative to whites than prior
to the civil rights revolution. See, e.g., JULIA B. ISAACS, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION,
ECONOMIC MOBILITY OF BLACK AND WHITE FAMILIES 4 (2008) (summarizing results of a

longitudinal survey finding that two of three white children from middle-income families
grow up to have higher real family incomes than their parents while only one out of three
African American children from the same income group surpass their parents in absolute
income levels).
115. See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 9, at 385-442 (arguing that means other than
Brown would have led to faster racial progress); GERALD ROSENBURG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:
CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 156 (arguing that Brown was a mistake
because it did little to bring about real change).
116. See Robert Chang, The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality and Its
Vision for Social Change, 7 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 197, 202 (forthcoming 2011)
("Rosenberg's and Klarman's backlash arguments... present an unprovable counterfactual).
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disappointment at the fact that many attempts to achieve important but difficult
social goals fail.
CONCLUSION

An analysis of the history of civil rights activism strongly supports the
continued pursuit of experimental approaches to address fundamental economic
inequalities and continuing structural differences in persons' life chances as
affected by a combination of factors involving both class and race. Those issues
are not something "other than" civil rights; they are the remaining issues on a
civil rights agenda that stretches back to the founding ideas upon which T.
Thomas Fortune formed the Afro American League. Some of that agenda has
been fulfilled, but some of it has not. Continued pursuit of ideas aimed at
achieving greater economic and social welfare equality is not only bold and
forward-looking, but is also fully consistent with longstanding civil rights
activist traditions.

